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Railroading Essential Rights:
The Status of Judicial Review of
Alleged Due Process Violations in
Arbitration Hearings Under the
Railway Labor Act
Shafii v. P.L.C. British Airways'

I. INTRODUCTION
In the American judicial system, no litigant may be denied life, liberty or
property without due process of the law. The rights to representation, to have a
fair hearing, and to have the opportunity to present evidence on one's own behalf
are ingrained in our concept of "justice." When one agrees to submit a conflict
to an alternative forum of dispute resolution, are those essential rights lost? This
Note examines those questions in the context of a congressional act mandating
arbitration as the mode of conflict resolution in the transportation industry.

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Seyed N. Shafli ("Shafii") worked as a reservation sales agent for P.L.C.
2
British Airways until January of 1989 when he was fired for insubordination.
3
Shafli filed a grievance with his union because of the firing, but then agreed to
a voluntary binding arbitration hearing as provided by the union's collective
bargaining agreement with the airline.4 The parties arbitrated the dispute pursuant
to the Railway Labor Act ("RLA"). If both sides agree, the RLA allows an
arbitrator to take the place of the National Railroad Adjustment Board which must
ordinarily handle such disputes.5
6
The arbitrator decided against Shafii in the January 1990 hearing. Shafii

then brought suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
New York, asking the judge to vacate the arbitrator's award for lack of due

1. Shafii v. PLC British Airways, 22 F.3d 59 (2d Cir. 1994).
2. Id. at 60.
3. Shafii had been a member of the International Association of Machinists & Aerospace
Workers, AFL-CIO, District Lodge 100. His suit was originally also against the union, but that portion
of the suit was dropped by stipulation. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.at 61. The Railway Labor Act created the National Railroad Adjustment Board as a
mandatory mechanism to settle disputes within the transportation industry. See Railway Labor Act,
§ 3, 45 U.S.C. § 153 (1966).
6. Shafti, 22 F.3d at 60.
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Shafli specifically argued that the arbitrator
process during the proceeding
improperly denied his attorney's request to have a witness testify about both a
disciplinary hearing and an investigative hearing which took place before and on
his termination date.' The district judge ruled that judicial review is available
"when there has been a denial of due process by some act of the board," and then
granted British Airways request to transfer the matter to the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of New York. 9
British Airways, in turn, challenged whether the federal courts in the northern
and eastern districts of New York even had jurisdiction over this matter.' The
airline argued that the RLA provides for specific instances allowing judicial review
of arbitration awards but that an alleged due process violation does not constitute
one of those instances." The judges in both courts disagreed, finding that
judicial review of the arbitration was proper. 2
After the northern district court granted the transfer requested by British
Airways, the eastern district court ruled against Shafli on his claimed due process
violation. 3 Shafii appealed the eastern district judgment to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. 4 Both the lower courts denied Shafli's
claim because of an evidentiary issue. 5 Meanwhile, British Airways filed a
cross-appeal to the same circuit court contending that both courts lacked
jurisdiction over the due process issue. 6 Both of those courts ruled that they
indeed had authority to review the arbitrator's decision for possible want of due
process.' 7
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the lower courts' decisions on
the due process issue holding that when a party to an arbitration hearing conducted
under the RLA may have been denied due process, trial courts have jurisdiction
to review the arbitrator's decision. 8

7. Id.
8. At issue also was whether the conversation, which was "off the record" so far as the
proceeding's transcript, was hearsay. Shafli's attorneys also wanted to submit the transcripts of those
hearings as evidence. A statement from a witness' affidavit to the arbitration hearing in question
showed that the arbitrator, when denying Shafii's request, stated that he "had heard enough and that

it was too late to get bogged down in technicalities." Id at 60-61. For this Note's purposes, the
hearsay issue is tangential and will not be dealt with further.
9. Id at 61.
10.

Id.

11.

Id. at60.

12.

Id.

13.
14.

Id.
Id.

15.

Id.

16.

Id.

17. Id.
18. Id. at 64. It should be noted that the case was vacated and remanded because of the hearsay
issue. This evidence directly impacted the due process issue outcome.
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND

A. Early History of the Railway Labor Act
Congress promulgated the RLA in 1926 to regulate bargaining and dispute
resolution between railway management and employee unions.' 9 At least one
commentator suggested that the RLA and its binding arbitration provisions have
served the public as well as the unions and their employers by avoiding
"continuous resort to economic warfare or the courts." 20
The RLA, as it was written in 1926, provided that it was the duty of all
parties involved to "make and maintain agreements concerning rates of pay [and]
working conditions" and to attempt to adjust all differences by peaceful means."
Toward this goal, the RLA established a national Board of Mediation as well as
an "Emergency Board" to investigate situations with the potential to "substantially
. . interrupt interstate commerce."22 Local "boards of adjustment" resolved
minor disputes but these disputes could also be taken to the courts under the
original act if they involved contract interpretation. 3
This system of limited authority for the RLA boards eventually proved to be
ineffective.24 In 1934, Congress issued a broad grant of authority to the newly
created National Railroad Adjustment Board ("NRAB").25 The RLA provides
that awards of the NRAB "shall be final and binding upon both parties to the
dispute" with limited judicial review.26
A 1936 amendment to the RLA extended its provisions to the airline
industry.27 The grievance provisions apply directly, except that the RLA
provides that every air carrier and employee union must together establish a
"system, group, or regional board of adjustment" with the same jurisdiction as
*

19. Herbert R. Northrup, The Railway Labor Act--Time for Repeal?, 13 HARv. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y, 441, 442 (1990).
20.
Leo Kanowitz, Alternative Dispute Resolution and the Public Interest: The Arbitration
Experience, 38 HAsTINGS L. J. 239, 289-90 (1987).
Northrup, supra note 19, at 442.
21.
22. Id.
Gary Green, Grievance Resolution and the System Board of Adjustment: The Labor
23.
Organization'sPerspective, 1988 C340 Au-ABA 343, 346 (1988). If the boards could not reach a

majority decision, the minor disputes could be brought to the same voluntary processes of mediation,
conciliation or arbitration as were provided in the act for "major disputes", which were defined as
disagreements over future rights to be assigned to parties. Id. at 346.
24. Id. (citing the Supreme Court reference to a"complete breakdown" in the practical workings
of the RLA grievance process in Elgin, Joliet & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711 (1945)).
25. Id.
26. 45 U.S.C. § 153 (1966). Green notes that the unions were actually quite supportive of this
proposition, even though its creation meant basically sacrificing the right to strike over grievances.
Green, supra note 23, at 346.
27.

Id. at 347.
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provided adjustment boards under the RLA in its application to the railroad
industry.28
B. Judicial Interpretationof the RLA
The statutory language defining the NRAB's jurisdiction makes the range of
judicial review of decisions "among the narrowest known to the law .... , The
RLA provides in pertinent part:
If any employee or group of employees, or any carrier is aggrieved bythe failure of any division of the Adjustment Board to make an award
in a dispute referred to it, or is aggrieved by any of the terms of an
award ... then such employee or group of employees or carrier may
file [a petition] in any United States district court . . . On such
review, the findings of the division shall be conclusive on the parties,
except that the order of the division may be set aside, in whole or in
part, or remanded to the division, for failure of the division to comply
with the requirements of this chapter, for failure of the order to
conform, or confine itself to matters within the scope of the division's
jurisdiction, or for fraud or corruption by a member of the division
making the order.30
Therefore, judicial review of an RLA board's decision can basically occur
under three instances. A court may review the decision if it: (1) was inconsistent
with the law of the RLA; (2) was outside of the jurisdiction of the board; or (3)
involved fraud or corruption. 3'
One way courts have historically tried to clarify the reviewability boundaries
of RLA arbitrations has been to classify disputes as "major" or "minor." Many
courts hold that "minor" disputes are the exclusive province of adjustment boards
and that a board's determination on such issues is thus final and binding.32 The
"major" controversies have been held to revolve around the acquisition of rights
formation of collective [bargaining] agreements or
in the future, such as "the
33
efforts to secure them.
The United States Supreme Court has long recognized the congressional
intent to give the NRAB broad power to interpret collective bargaining agreements

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Railway Labor Act Title 1I § 204, 45 U.S.C. § 184 (1995).
Diamond v. Terminal Ry. Alabama State Docks, 421 F.2d 228, 233 (5th Cir. 1970).
45 U.S.C. § 153 (1995).
See Elgin, 325 U.S. at 722-28.
See Id.
Id. at 723.
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made pursuant to the RLA.34 Such disputes have been called "minor" by courts
utilizing the distinction? 5 However, the Supreme Court and other Article III
tribunals have struggled to define precisely the type of conflict between employers
and unions or employees which constitutes such an interpretation. 6
The due process controversy at issue in the instant case defies simple
classification as a "major" or "minor" question or as an issue of contract
interpretation. The current split of the federal courts on the issue of whether due
process violations are reviewable reflects a line of confusing precedent and largely
ambiguous guidance from the Supreme Court on the issue."
In the past two decades, some circuits have indeed expanded on the "narrow
scope" of the RLA reviewability guidelines, "acknowledging the propriety of
judicial review where the Board denies the litigant due process and thus acts in an
unconstitutional manner. 3 Since 1979, the Fifth Circuit requires that in order
to base review on such a claim, the action must constitute sufficient denial of due
process so as to allow a collateral attack on its jurisdiction. 9
What action during a RLA arbitration constitutes a reviewable violation of
a party's due process rights? In 1986, an Illinois federal district court vacated an
arbitration award due to the lack of the timely investigation required by the
parties' contract.40 Yet the following year, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
found a RLA arbitration plaintiff's due process claim frivolous and that "once the
court is satisfied that [the arbitrators] were interpreting the contract, judicial

34. See Order of Ry. Conductors v. Pitney, 326 U.S. 561 (1946). The Supreme Court noted that
the "intricate and technical" nature of collective bargaining issues in the rail industry meant that the
Adjustment Board was in the best position to apply the terms of the collective bargaining agreement.
The lower court therefore lacked jurisdiction. Id. at 567.
35. Elgin, 325 U.S. at 723.
36. See, e.g., Moore v. Illinois Cent. Ry., 312 U.S. 630 (1941) (finding that an employee could
properly seek damages for'wrongful discharge in a court action, and was not required to seek the
opinion of the Adjustment Board first). Cf Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville R.R, 406 U.S. 320
(1972) (finding that an employee's claim of"wrongful discharge" was an issue involving interpretation
of the collective bargaining agreement, and therefore the Adjustment Board had jurisdiction over the
matter).
37. See the following cases for holdings against judicial review of arbitrated due process issues:
(1) United States Steelworkers of Am., Local 1913 v. Union R.R., 648 F.2d 905, 911 (3rd Cir. 1981);
(2) Jones v. Seaboard Sys. R.R., 783 F.2d 639, 642 n.2 (6th Cir. 1986); and (3) Henry v. Delta Air
Lines, 759 F.2d 870, 873 (11th Cir 1985).
See the following cases holding that Sheehan does not preclude judicial review of arbitrated
decisions: (i) Edleman v. Western Airlines, 892 F.2d 839 (9th Cir. 1989); (2) Steffens v. Brhd. of Ry.,
Airline and S.S. Clerks, 797 F.2d 442 (7th Cir. 1986); (3) Hayes v. W. Weighing & Inspection Bureau,
838 F.2d 1434 (5th Cir. 1988); Armstrong Lodge No. 762 v. Union Pacific R.R., 783 F.2d 131 (8th
Cir. 1986); and (4) Radin v. United States, 699 F.2d 681 (4th Cir. 1983).
38. Arroyo v. Crown Air/Dorado Wings, 672 F.Supp. 50, 52 (D.P.R. 1987).
39. See, e.g., Clayton v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 452 F. Supp. 107 (N.D. La. 1979).
40. Miller v. Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co., 647 F. Supp. 1432 (N.D. III. 1986).
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review is at an end .
,4""'The decision was to stand regardless of whether the
arbitrators were correct in their interpretation.42
The Seventh Circuit is not alone in its confusion on the issue. As the Shafli
court points out, the Supreme Court's 1978 decision on a due process claim in
Sheehan v. Union Pacific Railroad has become a source of confusion rather than
guidance.43 There the Court considered the case of a plaintiff who had been fired
and took his case to state court only to have that right extinguished by the
Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville RR. decision."' When Sheehan then tried to
utilize the Adjustment Board procedures, the statute of limitations on this
procedure had long passed and his claim was dismissed.45 The Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals found that Sheehan's due process rights were violated because
there should have been an equitable tolling of the Adjustment Board's deadline.""
The Supreme Court reversed the decision and held that the "statutory
language [of the RLA] means just what it says," in allowing review of Adjustment
Board decisions only when the party's objections "fall within any of the three
limited categories of review provided . . ." in the RLA.47 The Court urged an
"evenhanded application" of the finality principle, pointing out that it often
benefitted employees."
The extent of that finality principle as it applies to due process claims has not
been refined by the Supreme Court. As noted, federal circuit rulings on the issue
are inconsistent even within circuits.49 Several courts have interpreted Sheehan
to prohibit review of alleged violations of due process altogether."0 The Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals went so far as to note a 1986 case where the plaintiff had
"wisely abandoned his due process argument" since Sheehan held that alleged
denial of due process did not provide an additional basis for review of RLA
arbitration cases."'
Yet another circuit has interpreted Sheehan in the alternative, finding no
preclusion to the reviewability of the issue since "the [Supreme] Court found that
the NRAB had considered [Sheehan's due process] claim and rejected it," but did
not actually disapprove of due process as a basis for review.52

41.
Hill v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 814 F.2d 1192, 1195 (7th Cir. 1987).
42. Id.
43. Shafii, 22 F.3d at 62. See Union Pacific Railroad v. Sheehan, 439 U.S. 89 (1978).
44. Andrews, 406 U.S. 320 (1972) (extinguishing the right to make a wrongful discharge claim
in state court because NRAB was tribunal with final jurisdiction).
45. Sheehan, 439 U.S. at 89.
46. Id. at 91-92.
47. Id.at 93.
48. Id.at 94.
49. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
50. See Jones v. Seaboard Sys. R.R., 783 F.2d 639 (6th Cir. 1986); Henry v. Delta Air Lines,
759 F.2d 870 (11 th Cir. 1985).
51.
Jones, 783 F.2d at 642 n.2.
52. Steffens v. Brotherhood of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 797 F.2d 442, 448-49 (7th Cir. 1986).
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In the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, where Shafii was decided, case law
dating back to 1964, including D'Elia v. New York New Haven & Hartford
3
has favored judicial review of RLA arbitrated matters when due
Railroad"
process claims are at stake. The Shafii decision cites numerous decisions from the
district courts within the second circuit which have "at least assumed that due
process challenges are cognizable.0 4 However, the eastern district court in New
York held in 1983 that Sheehan barred due process review of RLA arbitrated
decisions." The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has not yet made a clear
statement as to Sheehan's effect on the sufficiency of the due process violation
claim as grounds for judicial review of RLA arbitration awards.
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Shafli, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals examined the history of how
other circuits have imposed judicial review upon arbitration awards in the face of
a possible due process violation. 6 The court noted that despite the narrow
language of the RLA grounds for judicial review, courts have historically
expanded those restrictions to include review when participants claim denial of
their due process rights."
The Shafii court gave great deference to the importance of the Supreme
Court's 1978 decision in Sheehan citing a split among circuits on the due process
issue following that holding.58 The court examined the opinion closely, calling
the Court's language "ambiguous" regarding its guidance of RLA arbitration
reviewability by Article III courts.59 The Shafii court noted that some courts
have decided Sheehan precludes judicial review of RLA arbitrations, while others
have reached the opposite conclusion.6 "
The court then explained its own interpretation of Sheehan, noting that the
language of the Supreme Court's decision was somewhat ambiguous. This was
due to a lack of clarity in the Tenth Circuit's prior holding in the case.6' The
Shafli court looked to the Supreme Court's decision and found that while the
Court did overturn -the Tenth Circuit's holding that the arbitrator in the case
violated Sheehan's due process rights, that reversal did not mean the Tenth
Circuit's due process review itself was improper.62

53. 338 F.2d 701 (2d Cir. 1964) (court not even questioning the issue of jurisdiction over the
matter in affirming a district court's finding that due process was satisfied in an RLA arbitration).
54. Shafii, 22 F.3d at 63.
55. See Valentino v. Am. Airlines, 1983 WL 2091 (E.D. N.Y. 1983).
56. Shafili, 22 F.3d at 62.
57. Id.
58.

Id.

59.
60.
61.
62.

Id.
Id.at 62-63.
Id.at 62.
Id.
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The Second Circuit Court of Appeals closely examined the Supreme Court's
opinion and found that the Court was looking to the case's facts when it held
improper a reversal on due process grounds.63 In addition, the Shafli court
interpreted Sheehan as ruling in the alternative that the lower court in that case
would have exceeded its jurisdiction had it overturned an RLA arbitrator's
decision based on a disagreement over either the legal reasoning or the final
result.'
The Shafli court concluded that neither of these grounds constituted a
preclusion of due process review and that courts interpreting Sheehan this way had
failed to conduct an "independent analysis of the language and structure of the
Supreme Court opinion."65 The court then referenced several other jurisdictions
that have analyzed Sheehan and held the decision does not preclude due process
review.66 The court also pointed to several district courts within the Second
Circuit that have found due process review at least "cognizable."67
In the instant decision, the Shafli court held British Airways incorrectly
attempted to apply Sheehan to preclude due process review.68 The Second
Circuit argued that the Supreme Court itself assumed jurisdiction over the due
process issue when it found the Tenth Circuit mistaken in its ruling that a due
process violation had occurred in arbitration.69
The Shafli court then referenced a case involving a challenge to a ruling by
the Board of Indian Appeals, a non-judicial review board whose decisions are
supposed to be "final and conclusive" according to the statute.7" However, there
was no evidence that congressional efforts intended to create finality included the
preclusion of due process rights.7' The Ninth Circuit carved out an exception to
this finality rule in the event of possible constitutional rights violations.72
The court used similar reasoning in the instant case, finding that there was
no clear evidence of congressional intent to remove the right of due process
protection from RLA governed proceedings.73 The Shafii court concluded it was,
therefore, unwilling to "leave unprotected a plaintiff's legitimate constitutional
right to be treated in accord with due process" by denying judicial review of

63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id at 63.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 63-64. The Shafli court goes on to cite another district court, within the Second
Circuit, that argues Sheehan was meant to narrow the Tenth Circuit's incorrect assumption that a wide
range of RLA arbitration reviewability was permissible, but not to the extent of precluding due process
review when necessary. Shafli, 22 F.3d at 64 (citing Bhd. of Maintenance of Way Employees v. St.
Johnsbury & L.C. R.R., 512 F. Supp. 1079 (D.Vt. 1981)).
69. Shafti, 22 F.3d at 63.
70. Id. at64.
71.
Id
.72. Id.
73. Id
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decisions by public entities such as RLA review boards.74 Therefore, the Second
7
Circuit position on reviewability was unaffected by the Sheehan decision. "
Based upon this interpretation of Sheehan and through analogy to other cases, the
court upheld the lower court's jurisdiction to review alleged due process violations
during RLA arbitrations.76
IV. COMMENT
Shafli clarified the Second Circuit Court of Appeals position and presented
an interpretation of the leading Supreme Court case of Sheehan on the due process
reviewability issue. The instant case may provide guidance to other circuits in
their examination of Sheehan.
The Supreme Court had the opportunity to provide important direction for
lower courts on the controversial and then relatively new issue on the propriety of
court intervention into potentially unconstitutional arbitration hearings. Instead,
the Court noted, "We have time and again emphasized that this statutory language
means just what it says."7' 7 The Court failed to explain exactly what this phrase
means for courts attempting to follow the statutory language in limiting their
interference with the finality of RLA arbitrations. Consequently, while the
Supreme Court denied Sheehan's due process cause of action because the lower
court had simply stepped in to disagree with the legal reasoning of the arbitrator,
the imprecise language of the decision left some courts with the impression that
possible due process violations within arbitrations are never proper domain for
court intervention.78
From the 1978 Sheehan decision to the instant Second Circuit case, courts
have struggled to reconcile the importance of recognizing arbitration decisions'
finality with the responsibility to enforce the participants' constitutional guarantee
of due process.
According to traditional arbitration theory, constitutional rights have little or
no bearing on disputes resolved in this alternative forumn. 7 9 The parties have
theoretically agreed to a speedy resolution outside of court, there is no state action
involved and the parties enter arbitration having made a voluntary contract to
resolve conflicts without the traditional court system (and its inherent
constitutional protections).80 Respect for the finality of an arbitrator's decision
benefits not only the victor in a case, but in a larger sense preserves the integrity
of the process by giving the arbitrator and the participants the knowledge that the
decision cannot be second guessed.

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Sheehan, 439 U.S. at 93.
See, e.g., Jones, 783 F.2d at 642.
Edward Brunet, Arbitration and ConstitutionalRights, 71 N.C. L. REv. 81, 81 (1992).
Id.at 82.
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Yet the traditional reasoning for respecting finality has become less
persuasive as alternative dispute resolution is used more frequently. The
expansion of arbitration in the 1980's brought a corresponding contraction to the
amount of judicial review interpreted to be allowed by the Federal Arbitration
Act."' Increased use of arbitration has brought renewed concern about the notion
of parties willingly "waiving" their due process rights, since many participants are
"novices" who sign boilerplate agreements in arbitration clauses. 2 Consequently,
the long term success of arbitration agreements between labor unions and
employers has evolved along with a doctrine that arbitrators will adhere to an ideal
of "procedural fairness" designed to assure (but perhaps not guarantee) due
process. 3
The possible waiver of constitutional rights by arbitrating parties is secondary
to the issue of state-mandated action in Shafi. The Shaffii court properly held that
statutorily mandated RLA arbitration indeed constituted state action and, therefore,
found that a waiver of constitutional rights would be inherently inappropriate.84
While the arbitration duty within the RLA is designed to virtually eliminate the
authority of courts in deciding employment contract conflicts," Shafli and other
courts have properly recognized that the arbitrators' decisions under the statute
"are acts of government, and must not deprive anyone of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law."86 To decline jurisdiction over due process would
eventually provide individuals a disincentive to agree to a generally beneficial
scheme as they would risk having no recourse in the face of blatant unfairness. 7
The Shafii court properly couches its argument in terms of recognizing the
competing policies at issue in the case. The court declines to find a bright-line
rule in the Sheehan decision, instead looking to similar applications of statutory
law in which due process review has been justified and noting that it does not
seem to be Congress' intent to preclude such review.88 The Shafli court also
carefully considers how other courts have looked to precedent in dealing with the
due process issue, concluding that no justification in case law or otherwise exists

81. Id. at 110-11.
82. Id.at 105-106.
83. Id.at 91. Brunet notes that labor arbitrators do not as a rule completely ignore constitutional
considerations, mostly because this would be devastating to long-term relations between employees and
employers. He notes that "[e]xamination of labor arbitration decisions demonstrates that some measure
of civil liberties protection is present in the arbitral process by virtue of labor arbitrators' use of their
unique brand of 'due process of arbitration.'" Id.at 92. Brunet labels this brand as "industrial due
process." Id.at 93.
84. Shafi, 22 F.3d at 64.
85. Green, supra note 23, at 345.
86. Shafli, 22 F.3d at 64 (citing Elmore v. Chicago & IM. Ry., 782 F.2d 94, 96(7th Cir.1986)).
87. Brunet, supra note 79, at 85-88. Brunet writes that the "weight of authority permits an
arbitrator to 'do justice as he sees it,"' and therefore the concept of finality also means that there is
often no formal evidence or explanation to back up the "fairness" of adecision to which the courts and
the parties must theoretically pay complete deference. Id.
88. Shaffli, 22 F.3d at 64.
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to "leave unprotected a plaintiff's legitimate constitutional right to be treated in
accord with due process ....f089
Following Shafli, the Second Circuit is left with a clear statement of the
propriety of due process review from RLA arbitration hearings. Other circuits can
look to this interpretation of the Supreme Court's Sheehan opinion to bolster their
own justification for taking jurisdiction over such matters. In a broader sense, the
opinion may provide a leading example of a "backlash" against absolute finality
of arbitration hearings when that finality may overlook a due process violation.
The Sheehan court held that a central congressional purpose for the RLA
mandatory arbitration provision was "to keep ...so called 'minor' disputes within
the Adjustment Board and out of the courts."9 ° But, the Shaffii court properly
concluded that while the RLA allowed judicial review on three grounds, the
absence of a due process violation in this express list of reviewable issues is not
indicative of congressional intent to completely foreclose judicial review of
constitutional claims.9 The essential right of due process cannot be classified
as a "minor" issue that must stay outside of the courthouse simply to preserve the
finality of an arbitrator's decision. Shafli demonstrates that the integrity of the
arbitration process is actually better served by permitting the safeguard of judicial
reviewability when personal rights are at stake.
V.

CONCLUSION

While the Shafii case essentially solidifies the direction the Second Circuit
seems to be headed on the due process issue, the decision is a deliberate step
towards unifying the various federal circuits on the status of RLA arbitration
reviewability. By criticizing the conflicting opinions of the Sixth, Third and
Eleventh Circuits as lacking "independent analysis of the language and structure
of the Supreme Court's opinion [in Sheehan],"92 the Second Circuit seems to be
challenging those courts to reconsider their reasoning on the issue in the future.
Perhaps after Shafii, those courts will refuse to read Sheehan as precluding judicial
review and will instead consider the review of possible due process violations as
matters both within their duty and their jurisdiction.
PENELOPE HOPPER

89.
90.
91.
92.

Id.
Sheehan, 439 U.S. at 94.
Shafii, 22 F.3d at 64 (citing Edelman, 892 F.2d at 847).
Id.at 62.
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